Appointment of a Plebiscite Advisor
Section 8 of the 1970 Act: This section placed the responsibility on the Azad Kashmir Government to act in accordance with the UNSC Resolutions, which included the organization and administration of the plebiscite as well as ensuring that the will of the Kashmiri people was given the opportunity to be expressed through a free and fair vote.Section 11 of the 1974 Act: This section extended the constitutional duty of the Pakistan government to ensure the plebiscite process was carried out in accordance with the UNCIP Resolutions and UNSC guidelines. It outlined the procedures for conducting the plebiscite, which included demilitarization, supervision of the vote by the United Nations, and ensuring that the Kashmiri people could make theirchoice between India, Pakistan, or independence. Court provided a clear legal declaration of their non-compliance with these obligations, which, since then, has evolved into a case of contempt of court.Both governments’ failure to discharge their constitutional duties has resulted in a continuing denial of the Kashmiri people’s right to self-determination, as promised under the UN resolutions and the UNCIP framework. Their non-compliance not only jeopardizes the legitimacy of their own governance but also undermines the legally binding nature of the UN resolutions and international commitments made in good faith. This ongoing contempt of court perpetuates the Kashmir dispute, denying the Kashmiri people the opportunity to have their say in their political future and keeping the region locked inconflict. Dr Syed Nazir Gilani Dr-nazirgilani@jkchr.com.
Burhan Wani is a symbol and not a legacy!
The legacy of the Kashmir struggle traces its origins to the slogan “Kashmir for Kashmiris” and the first sacrifice of 22 martyrs on 13 July 1931. This event marked the beginning of Kashmir’s resistance against oppressive rule and the people’s demand for self-determination, symbolizing the fight for justice, rights, and identity. Over time, the struggle has evolved and is now deeply rooted in the UN template on Kashmir, which calls for a peaceful and just resolution based on the right to self-determination, while upholding the principle of inclusiveness, representing all Kashmiris in their quest for freedom and dignity. While Burhan Wani is a prominent figure in the contemporary narrative, he does not constitute the foundation of Kashmir’s legacy. Instead, his life and death are more accurately described as a manifestation of frustration and the denial of political voice to the youth of Kashmir. His emergence as a symbol of resistance is a response to the lack of political space for the Kashmiri youth, who feel increasingly disenfranchised. However, Burhan Wani’s individual sacrifice cannot overshadow the broader suffering of an entire generation of Kashmiris, particularly since 1990, when thousands of young lives have been lost in the conflict. These collective sacrifices far outweigh the symbolic significance of any single individual. The struggle for Kashmir remains grounded in its historical and legal roots, and not in isolated acts of rebellion. Burhan Wani’s legacy, however, reflects the growing discontent among young Kashmiris, who feel trapped in a system that profiles, targets, and offers financial rewards for their elimination. His life is embedded as a symbol of one of the six frozen interest groups referred to by the UK’s Philip Noel-Baker during the UN Security Council meeting 241, held on 5 February 1948. In this meeting, Noel-Baker identified these six groups as Pakistan, insurgents, tribesmen, the Government of India, the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir, and the outside world. As Noel-Baker stated: “What the Security Council does must seem fair to these two parties. It must also seem fair to the Government of Pakistan, to the insurgents, to the tribesmen, to the Government of India, to the other inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir, and to the outside world. That is why I arrived at the same conclusion as the other members of the Security Council who stated that impartial, interim administrative arrangements must be made.” The jurisprudence of the UN template on Kashmir requires careful and correct articulation. The Prime Minister has inadvertently made an error in not differentiating between legacy and symbol. The true legacy of the Kashmir struggle lies in its long-standing demand for justice and self-determination, beginning in 1931 and embedded in international law, while Burhan Wani remains a symbol of the frustration faced by Kashmiri youth, rather than the centralfigure of the struggle’s legacy. Dr Syed Nazir Gilani Dr-nazirgilani@jkchr.com.
Azad Kashmir at UNGA – Missed Opportunity
I will be making a detailed response to the Prime Minister’s reference to Kashmir in his UNGA address. At this point, however, I wish to emphasize that his remarks on Azad Kashmir, particularly in response to Indian leaders’ threats to “cross the Line of Control” and “take over Azad Kashmir,” were weak and unpersuasive. What the Prime Minister’s Position Should Have Been: The Prime Minister should have introduced Azad Kashmir within the UN template on Kashmir. He could have leveraged its legal and political significance by drawing attention to Pakistan’s compliance with international law while contrasting it with India’s violations in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir. Unfortunately, several key opportunities to present a compelling argument were missed. Missed Opportunity: The Prime Minister did not emphasize how Pakistan has maintained Azad Kashmir’s governance in line with UN resolutions, preserving it as an autonomous entity awaiting a plebiscite, while India has blatantly defied the same framework by altering the status and demographics of Jammu & Kashmir. Missed Opportunity: The Prime Minister failed to present Azad Kashmir as a region ready for a plebiscite under UN supervision, missing the chance to press the international community to address India’s violations of the UN framework. The Government of Pakistan must also begin to see Azad Kashmir beyond the restrictive interpretation of Clause VIII of the Karachi Agreement. Dr Syed Nazir Gilani Dr-nazirgilani@jkchr.com.
The giant ‘Broken Chair’
Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy – IVLocal Authority Concept Deliberately Sabotaged A careful and unbiased examination of the role of the politicians of Azad Kashmir after the re-constitution of the Government of Azad Kashmir on 24 October 1947 and the assurance of the Government of Pakistan held out to the UNCIP delegation in September 1948, we see that both Governments have reneged on their first declared positions. Neither the Government of Azad Kashmir carried on the terms of the Provisional Declaration nor did the Government of Pakistan honour her assurance to let the Government of Azad Kashmir to speak directly to UN or through it as its medium. United Nations had fully explained and expressed a full regard to safeguard law and order, the integrity of the cease-fire-line and the security of the territory on each side of that line. It was on this basis that UNMOGIP were brought in, in January 1949. Clause A.3 of Part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 provided that pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. In its letter dated 3 September 1948, the Commission defined the “evacuated territory” to mean “those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command”. (UNCIP’s First Report, Paragraph 90). As a result of the demarcation of the cease-fire line all territories situated on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be regarded as “evacuated territory”. The United Nations Commission told the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that by the term “local authorities” it meant the Azad Kashmir Government, though the Commission could not accord de jure recognition to a revolutionary authority such as the Azad Kashmir Government. The Commission also gave the assurance that no official of the Government of India, or of the Maharaja’s Government, would be permitted to enter the evacuated territory. (Vide UNCIP’s Summary-Record of the meeting held on 31 August 1948). Azad Kashmir Government was recognised a de facto revolutionary authority. However, the de jure sovereign authority was accorded to Government of Jammu and Kashmir, duly established by the Maharajah of Kashmir and re-organised under the supervision of Sheikh Abdullah. The Government of India maintained, “that the administration of “this area would, under para 3 of Part II of the Resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities under the same resolution only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir state. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force.” In regards to settle an unease and a growing feeling of an inequity in the balance of the two forces in character and number, on either side of the cease-fire-line United Kingdom made an important observation at the 606 th meeting of the UN Security Council ……It stated that, “United Kingdom Government has never thought that the proposal to limit the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line to an armed civil police force while leaving a military force on the other side of the cease-fire line was consistent with a really free plebiscite”. The Government of India made an accommodating response and said that, she considered “a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side considering the pre-aggression strength of forces policing this area. However, they would be prepared to consider an appropriate increase to provide for the needs of the Northern areas or should the United Nations Representative, under whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make out a case that this strength is inadequate”. The remaining Azad Kashmir forces had to be “separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command and will be officered by neutral and local officers under the surveillance of the United Nations”. UNCIP had fully succeeded in reconciling India and Pakistan that “Pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. The local authorities shall undertake the fulfilment of such duties as are necessary for the observance within that territory of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949”. We find that diplomacy in Islamabad, got hooked on, other interests sans Kashmir. It addressed itself and full time, to the three issues, namely, (i) division of military stores, (ii) division of cash balances and on the (iii) interference with the reserve Bank so as to destroy the monetary and currency fabric of Pakistan. The politicians in Azad Kashmir, fell on the bones of greed and started looking for patronage in Pakistan. It needed a climb down and restricting a culture of corruption and quid pro quo. Leadership in Azad Kashmir did not have the capacity or if it had any, it was very inadequate to keep on prosecuting the principle of ‘equality’ and ‘self-determination’ and seek to correct any harm caused by any wrong interpretation of their case. It off loaded itself from the train and failed to work out the benefits of a “Local Authority” under the surveillance of United Nations. It failed to hold on to its de facto recognition as a “revolutionary authority”. We find that Government of Azad Kashmir did not ask for any representation at the Geneva Conference held from 26 August to 10 September 1952, on the “implementation of UNCIP Resolutions”. Jammu and Kashmir on the Indian side of cease fire line was
The giant ‘Broken Chair’
Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy – IIIMake a joint war on them Pending a UN supervised vote in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of Indiahas taken upon to “help Kashmir forces to defend the territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of the people”. This commitment stands in regards to the State as a whole and to all people of the State. UN discipline has set out three more restraints on the appearance, number and location of Indian army. Pakistan formally became a party to the discussion on the “Situation in Jammu and Kashmir” at the UN Security Council on 15 January 1948. It has flagged its role, to provide political, moral and diplomatic support to the people of the State. In addition it has ‘assumed’ specified responsibilities in Azad Kashmir under UNCIP Resolutions. Pakistan has entered into a detailed Agreement, called, Karachi Agreement with the Government of Azad Kashmir and the only political party which was functional in April 1949. In her reference made under Article 35 of the UN Charter the Government of India had pleaded that, “Invaders are still on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir and the inhabitants of the State are exposed to all the atrocities of which a barbarous foe is capable …The matter is therefore one of extreme urgency and calls for immediate action by the Security Council for avoiding a breach of international law”. Government of India made three immediate demands. In her reference she has stated that, “The Government of India deeply regret that a serious crisis should have been reached intheir relations with Pakistan. Not only is Pakistan a neighbour but, in spite of the recent separation, India and Pakistan have many ties and many common interests. India desires nothing more earnestly than to live with her neighbour-state on terms of close and lasting friendship. Peace is to the interests of both States; indeed to the interests of the world”. In its submissions in Document II titled “Pakistan’s Complaint Against India” Government of Pakistan submitted that “The tragic events and the happenings in East Punjab and the Sikh and Hindu States in and around that Province had convinced the Muslim population of Kashmir and Jammu State that the accession of the State to the Indian Union would be tantamount to the signing of their death warrant”. Pakistan does not deny the outside incursion into the State. In her Document III titled “Particulars of Pakistan’s Case” Pakistan submits that, “In conspiracy with the Indian Government, they seized upon this incursion as the occasion for putting into effect the pre-planned scheme for the accession of Kashmir as a coup d’état and for the occupation of Kashmir by the Indian troops simultaneously with the acceptance of the accession by India”. The submission adds that, “The Pakistan Government have not accepted and cannot accept the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to India. In their view the accession is based on violence and fraud. It was fraudulent in as much as it was achieved by deliberately creating a set of circumstances with the object of finding an excuse to stage the “accession”. It was based on violence because it furthered the plan of the Kashmir Government to liquidate the Muslim population of the State”. The sequence of events described in the Pakistan Document III do not fully agree with the Rights Movement of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. People had raised the issue of misgovernment and mal-administration in 1877. In 1888, the British Government asked the Maharaja to make certain reforms in the administration. Under a false pretext of conspiring with the Czar of Russia Maharaja was deposed for a while and when restored in authority in 1905, he was made subject to the veto of the Resident. Maharaja kept on working with limited powers till 1921. The first major demand was “State for the State’s People”. Kashmiris, who had hitherto been excluded from the affairs of the State, strongly resented the encroachment from outside. As education advanced, this resentment, which had been growing for the past half-century became stronger. The slogan “State for the State’s People” came to be heard everywhere. One can trace the desire for social justice as far back as to 1877. It was in October 1924, that the people of Kashmir presented a 17-demands memorandum to Viceroy Lord Reading. The major demand was that the “Muslim representation in the State Council should be according to their ratio in the population”. Therefore, the submission of a likening of Kashmir situation to what happened in East Punjab, in Sikh and Hindu States, does not hold strong. By 1932, people of Kashmir, had moved to third important demand for a “responsible government”. There is another puzzle in the submissions made by the Government of Pakistan in her Document III. All the love and affection shown for the honour and the welfare of the people of Kashmir, in particular, the Muslims has evaporated in thin air. While making an argument in reference to “the forces of the Azad Kashmir Government”, Pakistan has referred to an earlier proposal that it had made in November 1947 to the Government of India. It was to make a “joint war on them”, that is, on the independent tribesmen and the forces of the Azad Kashmir Government. The offer to wage a joint war, would occupy the interest of the present and future generations. Historians would have a subject of prime interest. The proposal does not remain in line with the fundamentals of the case presented by the Government of Pakistan at the UN Security Council. Nor has it ever before surfaced for a thorough debate. Dr Syed Nazir Gilani Dr-nazirgilani@jkchr.com
Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy – II“Agent and a Quisling”
Pakistan has submitted itself in writing to the jurisdiction of the UN Charter on 8 January 1948. It has welcomed the reference made by India to the UN Security Council on Kashmir and has assured the UN SC that it “will continue to abstain from any measure incompatible with the Charter which might aggravate the situation”. This assurance binds Pakistan in regard to the Intra-State obligation towards India and in regard to the territories of the State, that is, Azad Kashmir and GB on its side of cease fire line. The question of the territories of the State falling on either side of the cease fire line is duly addressed in UN SC Resolution 91 of 30 March 1951. It has been further elaborated by Philippines at the 773 rd meeting of UN Security Council on 20 February 1957. Referring to UNCIP Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, Philippines has said that, “Under the circumstances and pending the holding of a plebiscite, neither India nor Pakistan can claim sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir”. In its document III titled “Particulars of Pakistan’s Case”, submitted at the UN SC Government of Pakistan has said, “The Pakistan Government are glad that the Government of India have chosen to make a reference to the Security Council. In fact they have for some time been of the view that this is the only feasible method of peacefully settling the differences between the two countries. They have already unsuccessfully tried over a period of many months to seek a solution of the disputes between the two Dominions by the methods described in Article 33 of the Charter”. Prime Minister of Pakistan has stated in his telegram dated 16 December 1947 addressed to the Prime Minister of India, that, “The security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir. And the ties of religion, cultural identity and economic inter-dependence bind the two together still closer. The security and well-being of the people of Kashmir is of the highest importance to the people of Pakistan. We are, therefore, vitally interested in peaceful and honourable conditions for the people of Kashmir so that freed from all pressure, external or internal, they might of their own free will decide to which Dominion they wish to accede. The test of any course of action should therefore be whether it leads to the creation of conditions in which a really free plebiscite can be held”. Therefore, the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir, was already in the field, much before Government of India made a reference to the UN Security Council. Government of India presented her case at the UN Security Council on 15 January 1948 and made a prayer on the future status of Jammu and Kashmir in the following manner: “The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-à-vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, with a right to claim admission as a Member of the United Nations – all this we have recognised to be a matter for the unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir, after normal life is restored to them”. In the two part prayer, of the Government of India, her stand to recognise the unfettered decision of the people of Kashmir, became an important basis for a UN supervised vote. Government of India advocated this stand at the 533 rd meeting of the UN Security Council held on 01 March 1951. She added a human aspect to the problem and stated that, “The people of Kashmir are not mere chattels to be disposed of according to a rigid formula; their future must be decided in their own interests and in accordance with their own desires”. The United Nations mediator for the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan Frank Porter Graham evolved the principle of inclusivity. In his report presented at the 570 th Meeting of UN Security Council on 17 January 1952 he has said about the people of Kashmir, “They are a people of legend, song and story, associated with snow-capped mountains, beautiful valleys and life-giving waters”. “These people, Moslems, Hindus, Sikhs and Christians, as farmers, craftsmen and artists, small shopkeepers, boatmen, bearers and other workers in areas now on both sides of the cease- fire line, have been, through the centuries, the victims of exploitation and conflict. The recognition of the rights and dignity, the security and the self-determination of these historic people, under the auspices of the United Nations, might well become a challenging example of the progressive values of self-determination to the dependent peoples of the earth.” Pakistan’s Kashmir policy of a political, moral and diplomatic support to the people of Kashmir, has remained littered with unending somersaults. The policy has started with a historic error of judgement. In his cable of 24 November 1947, addressed to Prime Minister of Britain, Prime Minister of Pakistan called Sheikh Abdullah “a paid agent of Congress”. In para 3 Prime Minister of Pakistan has said, “The India Government are also trying to mislead the world by stating that people of Kashmir asked them through Sheikh Abdullah to send their troops to Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah has been a paid agent of Congress for the last two decades and with the exception of some gangsters whom he has purchased with Congress money he has no following among Muslim masses. It is astonishing that Pandit Nehru, who knows these facts, should proclaim this Quisling to be the acknowledged leader of Muslimsof Kashmir”. It was very unfortunate to call Sheikh Abdullah an “agent” and a “quisling”. Sheikh Abdullah could not be likened to the Norwegian politician – Vidkun Quisling. It did not take long that Government of Pakistan in her letter dated 10 November 1958, addressed to the UN Security Council, had to call Sheikh Abdullah, “the acknowledged leader of the people of Kashmir.” Dr Syed Nazir
Does Plebiscite have a future?
Kashmir has lost its regularity on the UN SC agenda which it had continued to occupy for 48years from January1948 to August 1996. Does Plebiscite have a future? If you understand thejurisprudence of the Kashmir case, the answer is, of course, yes. Pakistan had proposed thatPlebiscite should be held as early as in summer 1948, Britain had proposed that it should beheld by October 1948 before the snow fall began in Kashmir and the UN appointed PlebisciteAdministrator had plans to hold it by 01 November 1950. The Pakistani and Indian officials who paid a courtesy visit to UN appointed PlebisciteAdministrator Admiral Nimitz in March 1950 in his office in Washington had found that hewas working on the electoral register and was considering the precedent of NWFPreferendum of 1947. The view of former foreign minister of Pakistan KhurshidMahmud Kasuri that Kashmir issue is “dead now” is based on non-knowledge of the case andhas no merit. On 6 January 1948 President of the UN Security Council advised India and Pakistan that theSecurity Council would be taking up the question of Jammu and Kashmir for discussion. Thetwo countries should therefore, “refrain from any step incompatible with the Charter andliable to result in an aggravation of the situation, thereby rendering more difficult any actionby the Security Council.” On 8 and 9 January 1948, Pakistan and India respectively submittedin writing their assurance of compliance with the UN Charter and UN Security Counciljurisdiction. The lack of a reliable understanding of Kashmir case continues to remain an impediment andill-serves the interests of the People of Kashmir. There has never been any disagreement on aPlebiscite. It has been explained time and again that, “The lack of agreement therefore, doesnot concern this right of self-determination. It concerns the ways and means and proceduresto establish the conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people of the State of Jammuand Kashmir who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation.”(Netherlands 566 th meeting of UN Security Council held on 10 November 1951). Indian action of 05 August 2019 has no merit as long as we keep to the UN definition of thepeople, UN understanding of the three administrations, jurisprudence of UN template anddon’t hurt the case by making it a case of Muslims alone. The UN Secretary General DagHammarskjöld visited Srinagar in March to assess the political and economic conditions of“all” people. According to UN template on Kashmir, Indian action of 05 August 2019, is a“very grave offence” committed by India against Pakistan (other party), the United Nationsand against the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to self-determination. India has been monitoring the rights struggle in Jammu and Kashmir and the merits ofPakistan’s political, moral and diplomatic support all these years. It monitored HurriyatConference from July 1993 for about 26 years. India saw that the “Kashmiri guns” failed tofollow the military science and had no sense of plurality of the community. Kashmiri gunsfell silent and authors of militancy turned turtle. India found us all sitting in a cul-de-sac andothers wandering in the political wilderness. Therefore, Modi government decided todisenfranchise the people of Kashmir and “loaded upon itself a very grave offence”, bytaking the 05 August 2019 action. Kashmiri leaders and their sympathisers in Pakistan drifted away from the UN template andmade ad hoc interventions. The most injurious one was calling for election boycotts inKashmir. It weakened the merits of local vote as an instrument of strength and internal self-determination in Kashmir. Hurriyat and militant leadership has nothing to show for the past26 years. Their shelf-date expired for Delhi and unfortunately for Pakistan as well. It had tobe so, because we failed to set our compass correctly. India has an interest in Kashmir and has a constituency. She has made a reference to the UNSecurity Council and it has helped the people of Kashmir to have the contours of their casedefined. Pakistan has also an interest and a constituency. United Nations has not only defined the people of Kashmir and their rights movement, itappointed a Plebiscite Administrator to arrange a free and fair expression of will of thepeople. UN also appointed a Representative to seek demilitarization from India and Pakistanand to help in the work of the UN appointed Plebiscite Administrator. India had offered tokeep a 21,000 (twenty-one thousand) no arms bearing force. Even the last soldier could havebeen dispensed with by the Government of Kashmir and the UN Commission. Government of Pakistan, Government of Azad Kashmir and the Kashmiri leadership in AzadKashmir decided to share the responsibilities and there was an allocation of duties in respectof Plebiscite. They decided to institutionalise the work on Plebiscite in April 1949. Weshould have had a Plebiscite Advisor in place as agreed in the Karachi Agreement of April1949. Government of Azad Kashmir, under article 8 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government Act1970 and under article 11 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitutional Act 1974 hadto establish the institution of a Plebiscite Advisor. Under 1970 Act Government of AzadKashmir had to consult the Government of Pakistan but under Interim Act 1974, appointmentof a Plebiscite Advisor was left exclusively to the Government of Azad Kashmir. The judiciary of Azad Kashmir has helped the Government of Azad Kashmir in settling thequalifications of this Plebiscite Advisor. The High Court has given a detailed judgment onJKCHR constitutional petition Number 1992 in April 1999. The judgement is reported in theYearly Law Reporter 1999. The full court in its judgment has said, “The argument of the learned advocates for therespondents that financial position of the Government does not allow it to bear expenses ofthe plebiscite adviser is also devoid of any force. A list is placed before the Court of advisers,special assistants etc. appointed by the Government, besides about one and a half dozenministers, of which we take judicial notice. It is not becoming of the respondents to avert theConstitution and national responsibility under section 11 of the Constitution by putting up thelame excuse of lack of funds in the presence of
‘Pakistan lacks viable Kashmir Policy’?
This article takes further and examines the merits of the views expressed by Director GeneralStrategic Studies Institute and MNA Dr. Shireen M Mazari published in some daily Englishnewspapers in Islamabad on Friday February 26, 2016 on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Whileaddressing a workshop for the MNAs titled “Pakistan and Global Strategic Environment” atPakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services, Dr. Mazari regretted that Pakistan currently lacks aviable Kashmir policy, which is the first and foremost step Pakistan should take for the resolutionof conflict. One may wish concur with the view that ‘Pakistan lacks viable Kashmir Policy’ in the interests offour Kashmiris distributed under three administrations at Srinagar, Muzaffarabad, Gilgit and thefourth a strong diaspora spread all over the world. A good Kashmir policy is in the interests ofpeace and progress in India and Pakistan and the region as well. Currently the common people ofJammu and Kashmir have to endure a burden of five Governments (three Kashmir and 2 of Indiaand Pakistan) and need to reconcile their lives according to five constitutions as well. There is ahuge interference in their lives from surveillance agencies and almost every single individual inthe Jammu and Kashmir is indexed for a security clearance. A clue how the Indian intelligence remains overwhelming in J&K has been confirmed by formerRAW chief A. S. Dulat in his book at page 205 titled “Kashmir The Vajpayee Years”. He writes,“The IB had a sinister reputation in the Kashmiri mind. Part of it was because sinceIndependence, the IB had basically been running Kashmir, advising the home minister onwhatever happened there”. In general it would be fair to say that Pakistani academics part perform their duty and partlyperpetuate an ignorance or an undeclared Government policy on Kashmir. The first and foremostquestion that arises as a common priority, is whether Pakistan has a Kashmir policy. The firstanswer would be yes and the second immediate question would be whether it has followed itsince 01 January 1948 or since 15 January 1948 when Pakistan filed her defence against Indiancomplaint lodged with the UN Security Council. There is a policy on Kashmir but Pakistani Governments have been lazy and slack in theirattendant duties in respect of UN mechanism on Kashmir and on outsourced duties under UNResolutions, Constitution of Pakistan and the Constitutional arrangements with the AzadKashmir government. Foreign office of Pakistan too has continued to share this ‘let go’ attitude ofpolitical Governments on Kashmir. The first error of judgment made by the foreign office inparticular Kashmir desk was that it failed to flag for the attention of political Government inrecent years, that Indian-Pakistan Question was not raised at the UN Security Council for about31 years and 2 months, that is, from 5 November 1965 to 15 September 1996. In September 1996Kashmir lost its regularity at the UN Security Council agenda, which it had enjoyed in perpetuityfor 48 years from January 1948 to September 1996. It was hit by rule 11 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and deleted fromthe agenda. However, such deleted matters are allowed “to be provisionally retained in the list ofmatters which the Security Council is seized for a period of one year if a Member of the UnitedNations notifies its objection to its deletion before 15 September 1996”. Ever since Pakistan has arranged to notify the Security Council under this reminder provisionthat it wants Indian-Pakistan Question (Kashmir) to be retained on the agenda. This yearPakistan notified the UN Security Council on 7 January 2016 that it wants to retain threequestions, namely, The India-Pakistan question, The Hyderabad question and The situation inthe India/Pakistan subcontinent on the agenda. Although the present Government (Prime Minister) and the military leaderships (Army Chief)have reiterated the Pakistan Kashmir policy at the 69th and 70th sessions of UN GeneralAssembly and at the Youm-i-Shohada in April 2014 and at RUSI (The Royal United ServicesInstitute for Defence and Security Studies) in October 2015 in London respectively, yet it is notenough. Governments in Islamabad and their support units in the foreign offices and other disciplinesworking on Kashmir have not addressed the issue of outsourced work by UN to Government atSrinagar and India in relation to a free reference of the people of Kashmir under UN supervision.Pakistan Governments have failed to pressure the Government of Kashmir at Srinagar to set up aneutral, inclusive and responsible Government (with representations from Azad Kashmir andGilgit and Baltistan) to carry out the work outsourced to it by the UN for self-determination. Pakistan Governments have failed to highlight and pressure Srinagar Government that it is undera caution of UN SC Resolution of 30 March 19501, reminding it that it is elected from “only a partof the whole territory of Jammu and Kashmir” and therefore not fully representative to take anyone sided call in violation of UN mechanism on Kashmir. These Governments further failed to monitor the presence of Indian army in the Valley and pointout to the United Nations on a regular basis, that Indian forces that were allowed a temporaryadmission in the State as a sub-ordinate force to defend the territory, protect life, property andhonour of the people have in fact turned into a force that is at war with the people. Governmentsin Pakistan and AJK failed to flag for the attention of United Nations and other world forums thatIndian army was engaged in massive violation of human rights and more so was violating thecurbs placed on its number, behaviour and location in the UN Security Council Resolution of 21April 1948. Indian army has no other role except providing support to Srinagar in matters of lawand order, so that the former could prepare a peaceful environment for the arrangements of aplebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations. It is almost 68 years since Indian soldier was entrusted to be an aid in law and order situation.Things have changed and jurisprudence of this duty may be looked upon with recentdevelopments. United Nations could investigate whether Srinagar Government needs thepresence and assistance of Indian army any more. In the light of the fact that Indian soldier
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The Azad Kashmir Government was recognized to hold direct discussions with the Commission
A Government was reconstituted on October 24, 1947. It was intended to be a non-communalgovernment, comprising both Muslims and non-Muslims in the cabinet. This provisionalgovernment was to be temporary, tasked with restoring law and order in the State, enablingthe people to elect a popular legislature and government through free elections. The newly constituted Provisional Government expressed sentiments of utmost “friendlinessand goodwill towards its neighbouring Dominions of India and Pakistan,” hoping that “boththe Dominions of India and Pakistan will sympathize with the people of Jammu and Kashmirin their efforts to exercise their birth right of political freedom.” It assured that it would“safeguard the identity of Jammu and Kashmir as a political entity.” The personality of the “Azad Kashmir Government” was acknowledged by the UNCIP(United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan), which received its communication onJuly 8, 1948. UNCIP delegations visited Azad Kashmir on September 4 and September 14,1948. Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan cited three reasons motivatingthe entry of Pakistani troops into Kashmir: At its 19th meeting on July 20, 1948, UNCIP prepared a confidential cable informing theSecurity Council of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir. The UNCIP delegationreported that “As for the views of the Azad Kashmir people, the Foreign Minister’s intentionwas not to induce the Commission into recognizing the ‘Azad Kashmir Government,’ but hefelt that their approval, whether expressed directly to the Commission by their representativesor through the medium of the Pakistan Government, might be of decisive importance.” It was clear that the “Azad Kashmir Government” was free to represent its people throughtheir representatives at the UN and additionally had the option to use the medium of thePakistan Government. On September 6, 1948, at the 55th meeting, the Commission receiveda letter from the Government of Pakistan addressing various issues related to the UNCIPResolution of August 13, 1948. The letter clarified, “They (Pakistan) desire to make it clear atthe outset that these views are the views of the Government of Pakistan and are not in anysense binding upon the Azad Kashmir Government, nor do they reflect the views of the AzadKashmir Government.” UNCIP also made it clear that it intended to hold discussions with theAzad Kashmir representatives as individuals. The letter further stated, “The Government of Pakistan would at all times be prepared to useits good offices to persuade the Azad Kashmir Government to accept the views of theproposals of the Commission which the Pakistan Government themselves take, but suchacceptance must rest finally with the Azad Kashmir Government themselves.” The Government of Pakistan highlighted an important distinguishing factor regarding AzadKashmir. The letter addressed to the Commission stated, “As has already been explained to the Commission, political control over the Azad Kashmir Forces vests in the Azad KashmirGovernment, and it is the latter Government alone that has the authority to issue a cease-fireorder to those forces and to conclude terms and conditions of a truce that would be bindingupon these forces.” Thus, the Azad Kashmir Government was recognized to hold direct discussions with theCommission and was acknowledged to have the authority to order a cease-fire. Dr Syed Nazir Gilani. Dr-nazirgilani@jkchr.com.
